Friday, August 7, 2009

Etymological Reflection


In a field where the exact meaning of a word is crucial, it comes as perhaps no surprise that Roman students of law used to begin with a study of the word "law", or "jus", in Latin. While this lengthy etymology copied here is taken from a very old (the style of writing betrays its age) treatise on Canon Law, it serves as an apt reflection on the meaning and purpose of any kind of law.


Law: Jus

"[Justinian’s] Digest begins with this extract from the writings of Ulpian: “He who undertakes the study of the law should first understand the origin of the term ‘law’.”

The Latin word jus, for which we have no exact English equivalent, is derived:

(a) from justitia or justum (the state of justness). Thus Ulpian (1 D. I, 1) defined jus as ars boni et aequi, the art of all that is good and equitable; and St. Isidore (560-636), whose definition of jus Gratian adopted, says… “jus is so called because it is just”.

(b) Or it comes from the word jusum, or jubere, because jus means that which is commanded, namely, a law, an order, first called by the ancients jousa, and later jura. Thus, in the patrician state the laws voted on by the Roman people … received the name jussa. The chief, termed Rex, proposed laws to the people for their acceptance as follows: “Declare your will, give your command, Citizens,” or “Declare your will, give your assent, Citizens”, as the words originally meant. The Latin term for citizens was Quirites. An affirmative response was expressed by the letters U.R. (i.e., Uti rogas, I vote as you propose), and a negative reply by the letters A.Q.R. (i.e., Ante quo rogas, I vote as before your proposal). This was incorrectly interpreted by some to mean antiqua probo (i.e., I vote for the old law).

Several of the modern philologists go further and trace the derivation of the Latin word jus from other languages:

(c) Some maintain that it comes from the Indo-European or the Sanscrit root yu, which contains the idea of a bond, a tie, or a union, as in the Latin words conjux, conjungere, juxta, jumentum, jurare, and in Greek έυγόν, a yoke, and έεύγνυμι, to join. For jus is the bond whereby men are made subject to God, and one man is bound to another.

(d) Still others say that the word jus comes from the primitive Sanscrit or Vedic, Yos, which signifies what is good, what is holy, something pertaining to divinity. The reason is that right or law in the abstract comes from the divinity, and in ancient times it was the duty of priests in particular to pass laws, jus being closely connected with religion. Accordingly, Grotius and Vico, at once philosophers and jurists, considered the term jus as deriving from the Greek Zeus, which is the ancient form of the name Jupiter.

(e) In Greek, jus, justitia are designated by the word δίχη, and justum by the term δίχαιον. These words take their origin from the Indo-European dik which means to show, or to indicate, because jus is the index or rule of action.

(f) In modern languages, jus is designated by the terms diritto, droit, derecho, recht, right, and signifies that which follows a straight course, possibly from the Sanscrit root rgu denoting that which does not deviate from the true standard. In moral matters it signifies the rule of rectitude and probity. In this sense, then, jus is the same as “the standard of what is just and unjust”, after the analogy of the geometricians’ line or the builders’ plumb.

To sum up: Jus essentially consists in this: it is what is just or good, what is commanded, namely lex, what is holy and pertaining to God, what is straight and not devious; or finally, jus is that which indicates and constitutes a rule of conduct. Its meanings are many, the thing is one. For it portrays that the thing (jus) has its origin in God, the Eternal law, which alone is the sure and right norm of action."

7 comments:

Stephen said...

Very interesting post, Therese. I certainly didn't start out law school with anything like this.

I've always wondered about the word "jus" since it is very hard to translate into English properly.

Do you know what the difference between "jus" and "lex" is? I always thought that a "lex" was essentially a statute--a specific, written enactment, as opposed to "law" in the abstract. However, the last paragraph of this excerpt seems to imply that "lex" has to do specifically with God.

Aaron Linderman said...

Not to rain on the parade, because I think etymologies are great fun, but to what extent do they matter? Even the passage given translates a certain phrase "as the words originally meant," implying that the meaning of words can change. If, for example, I went before before some gay organization and explained to them that they were not really homosexuals because originally the word "gay" originally meant something quite different, I would be laughed out of the place (at best), no matter how many etymological examples I had in hand. What, then, is the significance of an etymology?

(And I do genuinely mean that question, by the way. I'm not simply suggesting that etymologies are meaningless, because I don't think they are. But I've not quite worked out their utility.)

Stephen said...

If I understand you correctly, Aaron, you are making the same objection many people make, for instance, to Heidegger's obsessive use of etymologies--and which I believe is also a valid objection--namely, that an etymology does not necessarily tell us anything about the essence of the thing we are investigating. I think the usefulness of etymologies, though, is that they are the best starting point for philosophical inquiry.

With regards to Heidegger, I remember that in one essay Josef Pieper mentioned that Heidegger put great weight on the fact that the German word for discussion, "Erörterung," comes from the word "Ort," which now means place, but which originally meant the tip of a spear. Pieper's question was, "So what? That doesn't tell me anything about the essence of discussion."

On the other hand, to use your example, I think that an etymology of the word "gay" might give us lots of historical/accidental (as opposed to essential) information about homosexuality. Granted, simply because homosexuals now go by the name "gay" does not change the nature of homosexuality, but it can tell us something about homosexuals' attitudes toward themselves, society's attitudes toward homosexuals, etc.

To apply this distinction to law, I would say that the etymology of "jus" gives us valuable information about what earlier cultures have thought about the nature of law. So, assuming the excerpted article is correct, many cultures believe that law binds us to God. That is merely a historical truth (at this point in the inquiry), and does not necessarily tell me anything about the essence of law. But, this historical information is valuable to me when I begin a philosophical investigation into the essence of law, because it tells me what an entire culture's (usually implicit) understanding of law was. The philosopher can't merely accept the etymology as completely true (since, for example, earlier cultures may have had quite mistaken notions about God), but he at least has a good starting point.

Finally, I'll just point out that this was Aristotle's and Aquinas' approach--begin with common notions (including words) and then examine them more rigorously.

Stephen said...

One more example, Aaron, which will actually strengthen your objection. "Equality" and "equity" have a common root in Latin, but have acquired distinct meanings in English (and had actually already done so in Latin before entering English, I'm quite sure). Simply put, the essence of equality is quite different from the essence of equity. They may be related in some way, but they are distinct concepts, despite their common root.

Northern said...

It’s a good question, Aaron, and not one I’ve thought much about. I would agree with Steve’s account of the arguments, but add that I think my understanding is closer to Heidegger’s, in that the etymology can (not always, though) tell us something about the essence of the word/concept. Starting with “jus”, since it’s on the table, the word doesn’t simply have one meaning. Our current sense of justice, or an overarching concept of law (as opposed to particular lex – I think you’re right there, Steve), is complex and, as I understand it, encompasses to some extent each of the definitions the author mentions. The etymology (and I found this passage particularly interesting because it went both forwards and backwards in development) substantiates that – provides objective authority, if you will, for what would otherwise be left, possibly, to a kind of cultural whim. In my experience with histories of words, the meanings don’t often completely die (“nice” might be an exception). Instead, they’re usually incorporated. This makes etymology particularly useful for writers or really anyone looking to use words in a fresh way, perhaps invoke a latent connotation and really give an otherwise static word meaning again.

Interestingly, the word “gay,” according to the OED, comes from the Old French jai, which around 1165 evolved to mean “licentious, lascivious, lewd.” It apparently kept this tinge into the early 1900’s when Americans used “gay” as a euphemism for a prostitute or for someone who lived a dissolute, promiscuous, hedonistic lifestyle. Homosexuals were apparently reluctant to adopt the term for themselves given such connotations. But it had already been done for them by the French starting in the 16th century, the feminine form being applied to men. That the meaning has changed so much seems to bolster what Steve says that etymology may not give us the essence of a concept, but only a society’s perception of that essence. In fact, here I’m not sure the meaning really changes, just whether we consider it a positive or negative idea. We humans can seldom pin a word and what it represents down to one meaning (lawyers try and get tied into knots).

Northern said...

And Steve, just to elaborate, I think you're right about lex being just particular law, jus being far broader. The last paragraph, as I read it, seems grammatically to join "lex" to the "what is commanded" rather than "what is holy", but I could be mistaken, this being a book on Canon Law, in which one of the Archbishop's primary arguments is that all law is derived ultimately from God, who has, in fact, handed down some specific statutes in the Ten Commandments. The author does not analyze "lex", so I don't know his thoughts on the matter. The OED treats "lex" as possibly related to "legere", meaning to read, so "that which is read", perhaps.

Stephen said...

You're right, Therese, not to set up a wall between knowledge of an essence and knowledge of a word's history. The chief way of learning what the essence of man, after all, is to look at specific human beings and their actions--to look at man's history.